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Non-technical summary 
This paper investigates the extent to which the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster of March 
2011 has had an impact on the private demand for climate protection in Germany. On March 
11, 2011 the Tohoku earthquake and subsequent tsunami hit Japan and the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant. Within a few days, the nuclear power plant went in to melt down and 
released radioactive material into both the air and the ocean. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
disaster sparked a worldwide discussion about the use of nuclear energy and the security of 
nuclear power plants. However, despite having major humanitarian and environmental 
consequences, can the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster impact the private demand for 
climate protection in Germany? 
Immediately following the disaster a debate about the use of nuclear power started in 
Germany. As a consequence of the disaster, the German government decreed an out phasing 
of nuclear power plants. This significant change in German energy policy will ceteris-paribus 
result in an increase in national CO2 emissions as Germany abstains from one carbon free 
technology. Therefore, in order to ensure the same national CO2 emissions the change in 
German energy policy implies a higher private willingness to contribute to climate protection. 
Another argument is that climate change is a potential driver of extreme weather events which 
could become a factor causing future nuclear disasters. Therefore, the increased awareness of 
nuclear disasters, as a direct result of the events in Fukushima, could also influence the 
willingness to contribute to climate protection.  
Data for the demand for climate protection in this paper are taken from two framed field 
experiments conducted in Mannheim, Germany, before and after the disaster. Within both 
experiments subjects had the opportunity to invest in climate protection by purchasing and 
withdrawing permits from the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) using their own 
disposable income. 
We find that the individual demand for climate protection among a sample of the residential 
population of Mannheim has changed significantly between March 2010 and December 2011. 
The demand for climate protection identified in the experiment following the nuclear disaster 
is significantly higher than in the experiment before the disaster. We conclude that individuals 
who wish to guarantee a certain level of national climate protection or who are aware of 
potential consequences of climate change for extreme weather events increased their private 
willingness to contribute to climate protection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Wir untersuchen, ob die Nuklearkatastrophe von Fukushima im März 2011 einen Einfluss auf 
die private Nachfrage nach Klimaschutz in Deutschland hatte. Am 11. März 2011 ereignete 
sich das Tohoku-Erdbeben und löste einen Tsunami aus. Der Tsunami traf das Kernkraftwerk 
Fukushima Daiichi. In wenigen Tagen kam es zu einer Kernschmelze, wobei radioaktives 
Material freigesetzt wurde. Aber warum sollte die Nuklearkatastrophe von Fukushima einen 
Einfluss auf die reale Nachfrage nach Klimaschutz in Deutschland haben?  
Die Nuklearkatastrophe von Fukushima löste in Deutschland eine Debatte über die Nutzung 
von Kernenergie aus. Als Reaktion auf die Nuklearkatastrophe wurde unmittelbar nach den 
Ereignissen in Japan der Atomausstieg beschlossen. Dieser Wandel in der deutschen 
Energiepolitik lässt unter sonst gleichen Bedingungen die nationalen CO2-Emissionen bei 
gegebenen Kosten steigen, da Deutschland freiwillig auf eine kohlenstofffreie Technologie 
verzichtet. Mit anderen Worten: Es müssen höhere Kosten getragen werden, um ein 
gegebenes CO2-Emissionsniveau zu erreichen. Diese Kehrtwende in der deutschen 
Energiepolitik könnte daher mit einer höheren privaten Nachfrage nach Klimaschutz 
einhergehen – wenn die Bevölkerung antizipiert, dass Klimaschutz in Zukunft mit höheren 
Kosten verbunden sein wird. Ein weiteres Argument ist, dass der Klimawandel die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit von Extremwettereignissen und damit auch Nuklearkatastrophen erhöht. 
Aufgrund der Ereignisse in Fukushima könnte eine gestiegene Besorgnis über mögliche 
nukleare Katastrophen auch die private Nachfrage nach Klimaschutz erhöhen.  
Die Daten zur privaten Nachfrage nach Klimaschutz stammen aus zwei Experimenten, die in 
Mannheim durchgeführt wurden. Das erste Experiment wurde vor der Nuklearkatastrophe von 
Fukushima durchgeführt, dass zweite danach. In beiden Experimenten hatten die Teilnehmer 
die Möglichkeit, von ihrem verfügbaren Einkommen direkt in Klimaschutz zu investieren. 
Hierzu wurden ihnen CO2-Zertifikate aus dem Europäischen Emissionshandelssystem zum 
Kauf angeboten. Die von den Teilnehmern gekauften Zertifikate wurden im Anschluss an die 
Experimente stillgelegt.    
Die Nachfrage nach Klimaschutz ist im Experiment nach der Nuklearkatastrophe signifikant 
höher als im Experiment vor der Katastrophe. Die Ergebnisse lassen den Schluss zu, dass 
Teilnehmer, die ein bestimmtes Maß an nationalem Klimaschutz garantieren wollen oder die 
durch die nukleare Katastrophe die Gefahr von klimabedingten Extremwetterereignissen 
stärker wahrgenommen haben, ihr privates Engagement für Klimaschutz ausgeweitet haben. 
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“The events in Japan mark a turning point for the world.” 
(„Die Geschehnisse in Japan sind ein Einschnitt für die Welt.") 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel as a reaction to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, 
March 2011 
 
Introduction  
The aim of this paper is to investigate the extent to which the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
disaster has had an impact on the real private demand for climate protection in Germany. 
On March 11, 2011 the Tohoku earthquake and subsequent tsunami hit Japan and the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Within a few days, the nuclear power plant went in to 
melt down and released radioactive material into the air and the ocean (American Nuclear 
Society 2012). Unsurprisingly, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster sparked a worldwide 
discussion about the use of nuclear energy and the security of nuclear power plants. However, 
why would the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster have an effect on the private demand for 
climate protection in Germany, being geographically removed and thereby not directly 
affecting Germany with the radiation emitted? The catastrophe provided the catalyst for a 
remarkable change in German energy policy which may, in turn, also imply a change in the 
private willingness to contribute to climate protection. Figure 1 summarises the important 
events.  
In 2002 the German government announced a gradual phase-out of nuclear power plants and 
the final withdrawal from the use of nuclear power by 2022. However, in October 2010 the 
German government controversially reversed this decision and announced a lifetime 
extension for nuclear power plants. Nuclear energy was to be used as a bridging technology 
for the foreseeable future, whereby, as of 2010, nuclear energy was to be part of the portfolio 
of carbon free technologies in Germany. On March 11, 2011 the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
disaster demonstrated the risks of nuclear energy, a consequence of which was for the German 
government to return to the plans of phasing out nuclear power and its partial substitution 
with fossil fuel-based coal and gas power plants. On March 14, 2011 the German government 
announced a 3-month moratorium on the lifetime extension.  
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Figure 1: German Energy Policy, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster and Dates of the 
Experiments 
2010 2011 20122002 2003
April 2002
Phase-Out: German 
government announced a 
gradual phase-out of 
nuclear power plants and 
the final withdrawal from 
nuclear power by 2022.
October 2010
Lifetime Extension: German 
government reversed the phase-
out and announced a lifetime 
extension for nuclear power 
plants.
March 2011
Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Disaster
March 2011
Moratorium: German government 
announced a 3-month  moratorium on the 
lifetime extension.
August 2011 
Re-Phase-Out: German government 
cancelled the lifetime extension. Eight 
nuclear power plants lost their operational 
license immediately the remaining nine will 
be shut down by the original deadline in 
2022.
March 2010 
Experiment I
December 2011 
Experiment II
 
In August 2011 the lifetime extension was cancelled and eight nuclear power plants 
subsequently lost their operational license, effective immediately. The remaining nine nuclear 
power plants in Germany will be decommissioned by the original deadline of 2022. This way, 
the German government has clearly decided to abstain from a carbon free technology. One 
significant result of this change in German energy policy is the inevitable increase of national 
CO2 emissions. We argue that people who are unsatisfied with the CO2 emissions related 
consequences of the change in German energy policy, i.e. the phasing out of carbon free 
nuclear power and their partial substitution with fossil fuel-based coal and gas power plants, 
may increase their private contribution to climate protection in order to counteract the 
increase in national CO2 emission levels. In order to ensure the same national CO2 emissions, 
the change in German energy policy implies a higher private willingness to contribute to 
climate protection. 
Another argument is that climate change is a potential future driver of nuclear disasters and 
that the increased awareness of nuclear disasters could therefore influence the willingness to 
contribute to climate protection. Climate change could be responsible for increasing the 
likelihood of extreme weather events such as floods, storms, and droughts (e.g., IPCC 2007), 
which are, in turn, serious threats for nuclear power plants (e.g., International Atomic Energy 
Agency 2012). Furthermore, climate change could also increase the likelihood of conflicts 
and nuclear wars (e.g., Scheffran 2009). Therefore, the increased awareness of nuclear 
disasters, driven by the events in Fukushima may result in the increase in the demand for 
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climate protection in order to mitigate climate change and decrease the likelihood of future 
nuclear disasters. 
Data used in this study relating to the demand for climate protection are taken from two 
framed field experiments (Löschel et al. 2013a, b) conducted in Mannheim, Germany before 
and after the Fukushima Daiichi disaster. During each of the experiments, subjects were given 
the opportunity to invest in climate protection from their own disposable income by 
purchasing and withdrawing permits from the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). 
We find that the demand for climate protection in the experiment following the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear disaster is significantly higher than in the experiment before the disaster. 
Specially, results showed that those participants who were, in principle, willing to invest into 
climate protection bought significantly more permits in the experiment following the disaster 
than previously observed.  
Experiments  
Both experiments referred to herein took place at the Centre for European Economic Research 
(ZEW) in Mannheim, Germany and were conducted using participants that had been recruited 
from the residential population of Mannheim. The first experiment (I) was held in March 
2010 and the second experiment (II) in December 2011. In both experiments, an incentive 
compatible market mechanism was used to elicit participants’ real demand for climate 
protection. Participants received a participation fee of €40 and were given the opportunity to 
invest it in climate protection by buying and withdrawing permits from the EU ETS. Each 
participant was confronted with a set of different prices for permits equating to 100kg CO2. 
Prices ranged from between €0.20 and €5.00 per 100kg CO2. Thereafter, each participant was 
asked to indicate the quantity of permits he would be willing to buy at each of the given 
prices. Finally, one price was randomly selected and the transaction was carried out at the 
corresponding price. Following the completion of the testing phase, the total quantity of 
permits were purchased and subsequently withdrawn from the EU ETS. Both experiments 
were subject to four different treatment variables: baseline, reputation, information, and 
collective1.  
 
 
                                                     
1 For a detailed description of the experiments and especially the different treatments see Löschel et al. (2013a, 
b). 
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Figure 2: Demand Behaviour 
 
Note:  
The horizontal axis represents the purchased amount of CO2 in kg and the vertical axis the cumulative fraction of 
participants who are willing to buy an amount greater than the corresponding figure. 
 
Demand for Climate Protection and Pool of Participants 
Participants were recruited following a random distribution of approximately 6,000 letters of 
invitation in Mannheim, Germany. In total, 360 participants took part, 200 in experiment I 
and 160 in experiment II. Figure 2 summarises the participants’ demand behaviour. In both 
experiments, the demand for climate protection is characterised by a right skewed 
distribution. Only in 43 per cent of all observations were participants willing to buy and 
withdraw permits from the EU ETS. Nevertheless, there is a non-negligible amount of outliers 
at the right tail of the distribution and the overall demand ranges from 0kg to 10,000kg CO2 
with a median amount of 0kg and a mean of approximately 340kg CO2. Furthermore, we find 
that the demand for climate protection increased between experiments I and II. The number of 
observations in which participants were willing to buy and withdraw permits from the EU 
ETS increased from 37 per cent before the disaster to 62 per cent after the disaster. 
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Consequently, the median amount of purchased permits increased from 0kg to 200kg CO2 and 
the mean from approximately 290kg to 520kg CO22. 
Table 1: Pool of Participants: Socioeconomic Characteristics and Attitudes and Beliefs 
towards Climate Change 
  Experiment I&II 
(March 2010 and December 2011) 
Variable Description Mean Min Median Max 
Socioeconomic Characteristics 
Age in years 41.72 18 40.5 75 
Female = 1, if female 0.52 0 1 1 
Children = 1, if at least one child 0.19 0 0 1 
Education = 1, it at least medium level of 
educationa 
0.90 0 1 1 
Income Categorical variable for disposable 
incomeb 
2.34 1 2 5 
Attitudes and Beliefs Towards Climate Change 
Green = 1, if votes for the green-party 0.27 0 0 1 
Level of 
Information 
= 1, if very well informed about 
climate change 
0.06 0 0 1 
Concerns = 1, if very concerned about climate 
change 
0.15 0 0 1 
Responsibility = 1, if convinced that that own 
behaviour had influence on climate 
change  
0.70 0 1 1 
Government 
Responsibility 
= 1, if convinced that only the 
government is responsible for 
climate protection 
0.08 0 0 1 
Commitment = 1, if convinced that there is still a 
need to fight climate change 
0.88 0 1 1 
Date of the Experiment 
Experiment II =1, if participation in  experiment II 0.44 0 0 1 
Notes: 
 a: Education: 1 (0) have at least a high school graduation or a professional training (others). b: Income: 1 if 
household income is  ≤1k€, 2 if 1k€ < income ≤ 2k€, 3 if 2k€ < income ≤ 3k€, 4 if 3k€ < income ≤ 4k€, 5 if 
4k€ < income.  
 
Table 1 exhibits participants’ socioeconomic characteristics as well as their attitudes and 
beliefs towards climate protection. Participants’ covered all age ranges from 18 to 75 years, 
whilst the average age of respondents was recorded to be 42 years old. Furthermore, 52 per 
cent of all participants were female and approximately 20 per cent of all participants stated 
that children lived in their households. Approximately 90 per cent stated that they had at least 
a high school certificate or professional training and the households’ average income ranged 
from between €2,000 and €3,000 per month. Furthermore, 27 per cent stated that they would 
vote for the “green-party” if federal elections were held next Sunday. Nevertheless, only 6 per 
cent of all participants stated that they are “very well informed” about climate change and 
                                                     
2 According to an Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, the hypothesis that the demand in both experiments is drawn from 
the same underlying distribution can be rejected with 𝑝 < 0.01.  
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only 15 per cent that they were “very concerned about climate change”. That said, however, 
70 per cent of all participants were convinced that their own behaviour had an influence on 
climate change and 88 per cent were convinced that there was still a need to fight climate 
change. Furthermore, only 8 per cent stated that “the government is solely responsible for 
measures against climate change”. Participants in both experiments did not differ significantly 
with respect to their socioeconomic characteristics or the majority of their attitudes and beliefs 
towards climate change. Only the amount of participants who stated that the government is 
solely responsible for climate protection decreased significantly from 11 per cent in 
experiment I to 4 per cent in experiment II3. 
Econometric Methodology  
The econometric difficulty of our aim, to test the extent to which the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear disaster has had an effect on the demand for climate protection, lies in the distribution 
of the demand for climate protection; Q. Q is zero in a nontrivial fraction of observations and 
the remaining observations are roughly continuously distributed about strictly positive values. 
Therefore, a two-step estimation procedure, as suggested by Heckman (1979), is used. It is 
based on two decisions: a participation and an amount decision. (∗) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑄 > 0|𝒘] = 𝜙(𝒘′𝜸) (∗∗) 𝐸[𝑄|𝑄 > 0,𝒙,𝒘] = 𝒙′𝜷 + 𝜌𝜆(𝒘′𝜸)  
The participation decision is given by (∗) and estimates the binary decision of whether or not 
participants are willing to buy and withdraw permits from the EU ETS. The amount decision, 
given by equation (∗∗) estimates the decision of how many permits to buy and withdraw 
given that demand is strictly positive. Furthermore, the unobserved correlation between both 
decisions is given by 𝜌. Note that a simple OLS regression of only strict positive observations 
on a set of independent variables in the amount decision would lead to inconsistent estimators 
if there is any unobserved correlation between the participation and amount decision. In order 
to avoid inconsistent estimates in the amount decision, the inverse Mills ratio has to be 
estimated based on the results of the participation decision and be included as an additional 
independent variable in the amount decision. The inverse Mills ratio is given by  𝜆(∙) = 𝜙(∙)
Φ(∙) , 
where 𝜙(∙) and Φ(∙) are the density and cumulative distribution function of a standard normal 
                                                     
3 All comparisons concerning the differences between the participants in both experiments are based on 𝜒2-Tests 
with 𝑝 < 0.05.  
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distributed random variable (e.g., Green 2003). Finally, we derived a set of price-quantity 
observations for each participant. Therefore, in all regression models a panel specification 
with random effects on subject level is used and clustered standard errors are allowed for. 
Results  
Table 2 summarises our main results. Model (1) contains the results of the binary 
participation decision. In order to allow for an appropriate interpretation, the average marginal 
effect (AME) is calculated in addition to the regression coefficients. Model (2) contains the 
amount decision4.  
Since the null hypothesis that there is any unobserved correlation between the participation 
and the amount decision (that 𝜌 is equal zero) cannot be rejected, it seems to be plausible to 
estimate the amount decision by means of an OLS regression of the quantity demanded on the 
independent variables, given that the demand is strictly positive (e.g., Wooldridge 2006). 
These results are given in model (3). After controlling for participants’ demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics as well as their attitudes and beliefs towards climate change 
and the different treatments we find that the timing of the experiments (Experiment II) had a 
significant impact on the demand for climate protection. The demand for climate protection is 
significantly higher in experiment II than in experiment I. Given that the demand is strictly 
positive, the demand increased in experiment II by approximately 40 per cent.  
Moreover, whilst the timing of the experiment clearly influenced demand behaviour, so too 
did the price of the permits, participants’ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, and 
attitudes and beliefs towards climate change.  The price of permits has a significantly negative 
impact on the demand of climate protection. Given that the demand is strictly positive, the 
price elasticity of demand is estimated to be approximately -1. Furthermore, participants’ 
socioeconomic characteristics such as their age and disposable income influence the demand 
for climate protection. Demand decreases with age and increases with disposable income. 
Participants’ attitudes and beliefs towards climate change also influence their demand. 
Participants who are concerned about climate change, feel responsible for it, and are 
convinced that there is still a need to fight climate change, have a significantly higher 
demand.  
 
                                                     
4 According to the exclusion restriction (e.g., Wooldridge 2006), we excluded the independent variable 
Responsibility from the amount decision in order to reduce multicollinearity in model (2). 
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Table 2: Main Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Probit RE RE 
 Q > 0 Log(Q) if Q > 0 Log(Q) if Q > 0 
 Coef. AME Two-Step Sample Selection Model Two-Step Model 
Date of the Experiment     
Experiment II 1.697 (1.207) 
0.267 
(0.176) 
0.392* 
(0.221) 
0.411** 
(0.208) 
Control Variables    
Log(Price) -1.735 *** (0.371) 
-0.249***   
(0.029) 
-1.036*** 
(0.036) 
-1.006*** 
   (0.026) 
Age -0.067 *** (0.026) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
Female -0.372 (0.606) 
-0.053 
   (0.087) 
-0.196 
(0.125) 
-0.195 
(0.121) 
Children -0.833 (0.912) 
-0.117 
   (0.120) 
0.127 
(0.185) 
0.218 
(0.179) 
Education 1.938 (1.501) 
0.247 
(0.156) 
0.363 
(0.379) 
0.406 
(0.346) 
Income 0.714 ** (0.349) 
0.102** 
(0.041) 
0.228*** 
(0.055) 
0.208*** 
   (0.052) 
Green 0.178 (0.741) 
0.026 
(0.108) 
0.204 
(0.130) 
0.191 
(0.124) 
Level of Information -0.301 (1.915) 
-0.043    
(0.267) 
-0.154 
(0.295) 
-0.267 
(0.303) 
Concerns 1.872* (1.077) 
0.270** 
(0.131) 
0.076 
(0.152) 
-0.018 
(0.142) 
Responsibility 1.497 ** (0.673) 
0.204** 
(0.081)  
0.539*** 
(0.157) 
Government 
Responsibility 
0.623 
(0.957) 
0.090 
(0.134) 
-0.089 
(0.361) 
-0.035 
(0.332) 
Commitment  1.725* (0.933) 
0.225** 
(0.102) 
0.487** 
(0.209) 
0.303 
(0.222) 
Reputation 0.948 (0.864) 
0.134 
(0.115) 
0.080 
(0.179) 
0.019 
(0.171) 
Information 0.178 (1.259) 
0.026 
(0.184) 
-0.099 
(0.204) 
-0.156 
(0.198) 
Collective 2.332* (1.294) 
0.332** 
   (0.150) 
0.204 
(0.231) 
0.173 
(0.216) 
     
Inverse Mills Ratio   0.056 (0.055)  
Constant 4.718** 
(2.339)  
5.068*** 
   (0.503) 
4.744*** 
   (0.503) 
Groups / Obs. 289 / 1083 202 / 502 202 / 502 
Log Likelihood -394.921   
𝑅𝑅2   0.4655 0.4863 
Notes:  (i) *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses.  
(ii) Definition of variables: Q: quantity kg demanded; Experiment II: 1 (0) if participation in experiment II 
(experiment I); Log(Price): natural log of price in €Cent; Age: age in years; Female: 1 (0) if female (male); 
Children: 1 (0) if at least on child (no children); Education: 1 (0) have at least a high school graduation or a 
professional training (others); Income: 1 if household income is  ≤1k€, 2 if 1k€ < income ≤ 2k€, 3 if 2k€ < 
income ≤ 3k€, 4 if 3k€ < income ≤ 4k€, 5 if 4k€ < income; Green: 1 (0) if green voter (other); Level of 
Information: 1 (0) if information about climate change is very good (other) ; Concerns: 1 (0) if concerns 
about climate change are very strong (other); Responsibility: 1 (0) if convinced that own behaviour had 
influence on climate change (other); Government Responsible: 1 (0) if convinced that only the government is 
responsible for climate protection (other); Commitment: 1 (0) if  convinced that there is still a need to fight 
climate change (other); Reputation: 1 (0) if treatment reputation (other); Information: 1 (0) if treatment 
information; Collective: 1 (0) if treatment collective (other). 
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Conclusion  
This paper finds that the individual demand for climate protection among a sample of the 
residential population of Mannheim, Germany has changed significantly between March 2010 
and December 2011. There is evidence that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster of March 
2011 increased the demand for climate protection. One reason for the increase in private 
demand for climate protection may be the move to decommission nuclear power and the 
remarkable change in the German energy policy as a reaction to the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear disaster. Individuals who want to guarantee a certain level of climate protection 
increased their private willingness to contribute to climate protection in order to counteract 
the increase in national emissions due to the nuclear phase-out in Germany. This is consistent 
with the finding that the amount of participants who were convinced that the government is 
solely responsible for climate protection decreased significantly by 7 per cent between the two 
experiments. Another possibility is that the increased awareness of nuclear disasters raised the 
private willingness to contribute to climate protection in order to mitigate climate change and 
decrease the likelihood of future nuclear disasters caused by extreme weather events.  
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